

## DILEMMAS OF A CONTINUING CONFLICT

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### ABSTRACT

It is not about Roland Emmerich's "The Day After Tomorrow" movie title, dedicated to a natural apocalypse of the world at global freezing temperatures, but to what has happened and continues with the Middle East conflict, where the temperatures are still standing at the boiling point. Recent meetings between political emissaries have shown the last prelude to this conflict, but not the post-conflict dilemmas. Apparently, we are much more in the stage that the parties intend to seek a strong position in what has come after the conventional conquest of the battle, but not the war. Bringing in the words Paul Mason, a reminder of the strategy, which states that in the days when states fought against states, generals could bring the enemy to the knees, but after that the politicians would need to design peace. This scenario is difficult to repeat in the current conflict. Many analysts think that there are many dilemmas in this conflict that cannot be further resolved with the previous classical formulas. In this process, we are discussing four issues that are hardly debated about post-conflict dilemmas.

**First: *Is the Conventional End to End War Conflict?*** The parties on the battlefield are lined up and declared their goals, actions and objectives. Faster or even a little later, the conflict went into direct final confrontation. This was not a "prophetic" prophecy as ISIS propaganda wants to express in the infamous "Dabiq". And this because in the coalition are not lined up only the infedels but also a coalition of participants who share the will to "wipe out Aleppo's Chernobyl waves," as former NATO commander and later a former CIA director in Afghanistan General Petrauk expressed.

This confrontation will, at least, and certainly lead to the destruction of ISIS's convention elements. We recall that by conventional assessment, ISIS has comparable potentials to a near-average state, but unmatched by the powers of the majority of countries taken separately and unmatched by those of a coalition. And in a conventional physical confrontation that is based on the force ratio, wins the most powerful. This conclusion was well understood by ISIS leaders. But can this game be considered as the end of the conflict? Many analysts believe that the power and danger of ISIS, less than its conventional capacities, is the risk of the ideology and inspiration that it expresses and will continue to bear even after its collapse. Shadi Hamid, a researcher at the Brookings Institution, says ISIS's risk lies in the morale that is trying to inject.

For other few other analysts, ISIS as phenomenon is beyond an armed conflict. It is a conflict that has gathered multiple elements, not only in the physical clash of military power, but also elements of religious, social, cultural, indoctrination etc. Therefore, a triumphant declaration for the end of the conflict will not have the optimism of the ultimate solution. To overcome the end of the battle it will hardly carry the realization of the peace process.

**Second: *Winning and defeating.*** For a peace agreement to be trustworthy, in the standard, it is required to sit in a table the winners and the defeated part. And while the winners' chairs are almost complete, on the side of the defeated, it is still unknown whether there will be any

party that will ever sit. The former US secretary of state Kerry statements express the idea of "extinction" of the conflict and not of "defeat". This is an advance in the concept of conflict management, but it will necessarily last the time to complete the process. States, generally into a successful way, have managed to "extinguish" the wars between them, the 3rd Generation, and manage post-war situations and finally reach the peace agreement. The situation differs in a conflict situation. The fact that, from 53 missions led by the UN, 33 missions of NATO, 17 EU missions, in more than 30% of them still persist, over 15 years, and 20% with repercussion effects after 10 years, turns conflict management into a very difficult and equally long commitment.

In the case of the actual conflict (ISIS), difficulties are multiplied, because the "defents" that would be required on the front line would hardly be found there. And this is because they are warlike partisans without war rules, front lines, and without linear access, not isolated but mixed with civilians, women and children. They (ISIS) will hardly raise the "white flag" very soon, or ever. More than with the hierarchy scale they struggle with blind obedience and indoctrination, which is more or less action with their prophetic mission. According to Wiliam Lind, they are of another nature and are being presented as "4th generation partisans, while the states seek and continue to develop the game according to tradition and still" play "with the 3rd generation tactics and strategies ..." . It is complicated to evaluate the solutions to these types of collisions. So if the losers do not sit down, with whom peace will be realized?

**Third: Can a common front with different strategies succeed.** In the Middle East (Iraq-Syria), the anti-terrorist coalition is estimated to have established a front which is presented with the strength and the modern capabilities in air and sea, and less on the land. They have no comparison in combat reports with the opposing party. So far it seems that the front is complete. What many scholars draw attentioni is the fact that these forces and capacities do not have the same strategy. Further, they have not reached a command-control line that could bring states under the same strategy.

There are over 60 countries ranked on the coalition side, but almost every one with its own strategy. USA, Russia, England, France, Germany, Turkey, as neighboring countries or the Gulf, each engaging in its own strategy. These strategies are quite distinct from one another and extend to a wide spectrum ranging from those to a final conflict resolution to those of influential areas, ideological and religious inspirations, and actions to revenge or isolation. In these circumstances a common front with quite different strategies will continue to be a dilemma for quite some time. Each of these countries would want a seat on the "peace table" after the end of the conflict. This position, for which the strategy is chosen, has many chances to be only for a dominant level, rather for their internal outlook. Under these conditions, when countries play each with its own strategy, and which differ significantly from one another, it directly affects the porosity of the common front, but not unique 6.

**Fourth: Seeking the enemy and his resources as far as possible.** Analysts are highly skeptical of the fact that most countries in the phenomenon assessment (ISIS) are analyzing this conflict with global effects at the national level and up to the regional level. In this flow a good part of the media does not hesitate to write superficial scriptures and only with media effects. Unlike from many scholars, who do the full anatomy of the phenomenon, are a lot of scripts that divert the attention of their public to rage in other territories and sometimes by making "fiction" discoveries. In the "resource" group of countries, enough media have recently "discovered" that our country is evident. Rather than staying true, these opinions

often lead to measures that do not provide a solution. The dangers of the "Schengen" movement, the application of the visa regime, the demonstration of military and police force will hardly have the effect of isolating the phenomenon, rather than the ISIS mission itself, to bring it the idea of insecurity at every corner of the globe. Conflict with ISIS is turning into a Gordian knot.

It is impossible to fight ISIS, says Pamela Engel in "Business Insider", without fighting the roots that feed her. Looking for solutions through the creation of "walls" has no chance of being implemented for a long time, because it is against the developments where these countries are participant and ideators. But they would also be linked with colossal spending, which the countries themselves would not have available for a long time. Looking at the conflict only at the level of an armed engagement can hardly serve for a longer time. William Lind says that "entering in a new generation (G4) will require a review of all previous strategies and doctrines that functioned in another generation (G-3)." One day after tomorrow's defeat of the opponent, we will hardly have a more complete picture of what is going to be revealed.

### **Where are We..?**

No matter how appreciated and how it is perceived, our country is already affected by the Conflict in the Middle East. Formally, we have been declared part of the terrorist coalition, where 60 states are now listed. On this side of the coalition, we are modest contributors, mainly by sending a limited amount of light weapons and a number of statements in support of the coalition. On the other side of the front, where there are already considered individuals from 82 countries, our land is deeply implicated at almost all levels: volunteers and now ISIS warriors, family-parents and children looking for the "promised land" ; young people desperate or adventurous, but also children who are orphaned or left orphaned in the streets of Syria and Iraq.

The current view finds Albanians on both sides of the front. On the one hand the state and on the other hand Albanian society. The state is cozy and there is no difficulty in declaring its will in the side of the coalition. We have done this well continuously. While the state is not so cozy to individuals who have taken the path of Aleppo (the symbol of the Caliphate), who have all the difficulties, first to understand the act committed, then to be found on a land where the idea ( indoctrination) hardly connects another reason. Further on, the way in which these individuals will integrate where they are started and gone will determine their future continuity. And one day after tomorrow, when the conflict is over, what will happen to these individuals and to their future.

Our state and our society, beside media, seem unprepared to face this phenomenon. And this is from the beginning to the end. A set of questions remains unanswered. From whom are inspired to take the road; what is that thing that forces the movement toward the imaginary; for us who claim to be the symbol of religious harmony in the world, today we are considerably (compared to the number of population) that we are participating in a religious conflict; in which situation are the Albanians in the unnamed state and without defined territory, which is called caliphate; if these people come to a moment they are disappointed or have ideas on how to help them; if they want to go back there, is any "open path"?; What is happening with the foundation motto of this nation "Albanian religion is Albania". Here we will not go no further into the dilemmas that what happens to those who are engaged in combat, because to what is declared in media, the rest is miserable.

It is difficult to evaluate the position of the state in this case. Or the state has full information (difficult) and does not judge to make it public or the state has been completely unprepared to deal with such a phenomenon. If the state (president, government, parliament) has information on the phenomenon, we may think that the strategy (if any) that is being pursued is such "hidden", "classified" and visionary. But if it were to be judged for an element of this "strategy" prevention - discouragement, it is necessary to be only public, well-organized and engaging with all political, economic, social, and cultural actors. Since this part has not yet seen this sends in the idea that the strategy either is missing or is effectively disorganized. The conflict that is happening in Syria-Iraq is beyond an armed conflict that shows a variety of views so conventional means (military, police, intelligent) will never be enough” says Marina Ottaway, from the International Center for Wood Researchers Wilson 8.

Under these conditions, returning in the relations between the state and the wretched mothers in the lands of Syria and Iraq, we are in another dilemma of the idea of contributing to the conflict. It is believed that the greatest contribution is not the weapons and statements against terror (they can be part of), but the contribution to clarify Albanians wherever they live, that they do not associate anything with the cause that ISIS propagates. The analysis of the reasons why a number of Albanians go at a one way road can lead us to the origin of problem-solving. But what does the Albanians link with Aleppo ? Invitation to debate on a social topic.

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