

MOTIVATION AND PERFORMANCE OF MAKASSAR CITY REGIONAL PARLIAMENT MEMBERS IN DECISION MAKING

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ABSTRACT

The study aims to investigate the political attitude and performance of regional parliament members (DPRD) of Makassar when they perform legislative function, budgetary function, and they perform supervisory function in the decision making. The study uses qualitative approach to study the political attitude and performance of the parliament members to make a decision in the regional parliament of the city. The analysed unit of the study is the regional parliament members elected in the 2009 regional election. The data were collected through in-depth interview and observation, then descriptively analysed and presented. The result indicates that the political attitude of the parliament members in the decision making process when performing the legislative function tends to accept and support the bill proposed by the local government. The individual motivation of the parliament members in discussing the regional budgetary plan of 2010 inclined to be directed to the interest certain groups and the bureaucratic needs. Their attitude changes when they discuss supervision function in line the change of the law No.22/1999 to the law No. 32/2004 of the Local Government. When the law No. 22/1999 was in effect the accountability report (LKJ) of the mayor of Makassar right before the parliament was often used by the local parliament members as a political device to gain some benefits for specific group/s. when the law No. 34 came to pass the mayor's explanation of accountability report (LKPJ) was no longer became the object of political mistreatment of the local parliament members because its function was only as administrative one.

Keywords: Political attitude, decision making.

INTRODUCTION

Since democracy becomes the modern state's primary attribute, the people's representative is the primary mechanism to implement the normative idea that the government must run based on the people's will. The authority of government will depend largely on its ability to transform the will and aspiration of the people as the highest value above the state's will. Based on such normative principle within a democratic practice of a country, the legislative institution holds a central position as reflected in the doctrine of people sovereignty and the sovereignty of the representative. This is based on the thought that the parliament is the only people's representative which has the authority to express the people's aspiration in the form of legislations while the executive will implement laws and legislation made by the representative.

The reformation era has yielded a useful consequences for the political and democratic life in Indonesia. This era constitutes a political learning time for the whole nation. The people undoubtedly and firmly express their problems to improve their lives and to survive in the future. In the time of the new order government, the people were the one who were oppressed. The many people's demands proposed to the people's representative are the first step to the democratisation in the country.

People's courage to express their aspiration more often with anarchical actions has to be balanced with the legislative members' quality improvement both in the centre (DPR) and in the region (DPRD). Regional Parliament (DPRD) is one of the regional representative institutions in the region which reflects the structure and system of democratic government in the region. This is clearly stipulated in the law No. 22 of 1999 later revised with the law No. 32 of 2004 about Regional Government in terms of status, rights and responsibilities, and function. As a people's representative institution, the Regional People Representative (DPRD) has a significant role to play in the running of autonomous regional governance. In such role, responsibility will become one of the determinant factors to insure a successful implementation of government so as to achieve sovereignty and prosperity. The following discussion will present a view that the people's representative needs to develop itself without forgetting its dynamic political infrastructure and the political stance of the members themselves. The people's representative both in the centre and in the regions consist of the elites of most political parties whose direction is to absorb the people's aspiration bearing a lot of policies and decrees issued by the institution to be carried out by the executives. This is so because of its status and function as the executives' counterpart as well as supervisor of the execution of the governing process, and as a principal endorser for every policy made by the executive.

In its development, the political stance of the parliament members both in the centre and in the regions tends to be more dominant in influencing the decision making by the government. This might be caused by the high bargaining position of the institution against the government that it seems that in every discussion of the policy to be issued the executive is in a weaker position. While the political performance of the regional parliament members is not very much different with that of the national parliament members. The political performance of the regional parliament members is driven by individual interest or fraction, or even the organisation (the parties) which in their course of action sometimes ignore the current norms and political ethics. This can be seen in the design process of the regional budgetary plan (RAPBD), the parliament members show their personal and group interest (political party and its constituents) due to their indebtedness to their political parties and constituents which causes them not to be in the people's side (pro-people).

Their political stance has also some impacts on other aspects in the implementation of the regional government. A case in point is the placement of personnel for a new post in the executive, or recruitment which is the prerogative right of the head of regency/mayor. The parliament members would try hard to influence the head of regency/mayor to recruit their candidates even though s/he does not meet the requirements. This biased political attitude is not refused by the head of regency/mayor due to their strong bargaining position and their mutual need. Therefore the mechanism performed is unhealthy because of the political stance of the parliament members seeking for bargaining among them.

Such attitude also occurs in the parliament members of Makassar City. Through their political stance, they can elevate their bargaining position against the government of Makassar City, particularly in the decision making/policy related to both institution and community. For instance, the budgetary planning and allocation of the regional budgetary plan (APBD) of Makassar City is always influenced by the political attitude of the parliament members who prioritise their own needs and interest than the public's needs and interest. The recent regional parliament's role and existence in this regional autonomy era is interesting to study particularly in relation to their performance to run their functions of constructing legislation, planning budgetary allocation, and supervisory task. Considering the high dynamics in the

community, the various aspiration in the community, and the high expectation of the community for their representative just like a specialist they are expected to cure various diseases of the patients. The community's high expectation should be balanced with their attitude show their side on the people. A number of decisions have been made by the regional representative in legislative function and they could be evaluated on the basis of the way they formulated the regional laws. At the level of responsiveness and accountability of this institution, there have been a lot of harsh criticisms from the community questioning the responsibility of the parliament members to bear their duties, authorities, and constitutional right to represent the people. Have they performed their duties optimally to serve the community they represent? Since the last general election, the parliament members have not yet performed their legislative, budgetary, supervisory functions pretty well.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study is classified into qualitative research with descriptive model. The study applies descriptive qualitative analysis on the political stance in the decision making at the regional parliament of Makassar City. The study focuses on investigating the legislative, budgetary, and supervisory functions of the city parliament in the decision making intensively, comprehensively, and in great detail. The analysis unit in the study is the individual parliament member selected for the study and the commissions, the fractions, and the institution itself.

The data were collected through deep interviews and direct observation in the field. The interview conducted to obtain information on the political behaviour of the parliament members in relation to the decision making. The observation was conducted by attending every assembly in the parliament, small committee meeting, commission meeting, and plenary assembly. To understand the attitude of the parliament members a strategy has been formulated and directly applied to the issues in the political institutions. The analysis applied is that of Huntington i.e. qualitative descriptive one. Such analysis is meant to study the political behaviour of the parliament members during the decision making process particularly in connection with the legislative, budgetary, and supervisory functions. In this process of decision making, observations were made to reveal the intention, motivation, and attitude of the parliament members in viewing a certain object therefore all actions committed comprise a unity using system component which is input-process-output-outcome. Meanwhile structural function used to analyse the political attitude of the members in the decision making should be in line with their functions the framework of structure/position owned by the members in the decision making process.

The study was conducted within two years since March 2010 to February 2012. Although the study took 2 years to finish, every now and then I had to go back to attend important meetings to fulfil the needs for data. Sometimes it is necessary to confirm the data obtained to a respondent or to add more information. The research was considered completed when it is said to be worthy.

The analysis unit is the regional parliament members of Makassar recruited in the general election of 2009. The criteria for the members under this study are:

- a) The parliament member of the 2009 -2014 election
- b) Has been a fraction's spokesperson when delivering the fraction's decision in a plenary assembly of the regional regulation draft proposed by the mayor or by initiative right of the parliament members.

- c) Chairperson, the vice, and the secretary of the legislation committee.
- d) Chairperson, the vice, and the secretary of budgetary committee.

The data obtained in the field were analysed with descriptive qualitative method i.e. narrative description of the phenomena of the regional parliament members' political attitude in performing the three functions to make a decision. The data were sorted out, simplified, and transformed as a crude data. To ensure their validity, an accurate data presentation is needed as an essential means of qualitative analysis. Such data presentation method is essential to establish a meaningful concept by connecting one concept with another in inductive way in order to establish a proposition. A review on the field notes is a verification or brainstorming among the members to make an agreement.

THE RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In this section, I will discuss the findings around the political attitude of the parliament members in decision making process during the plenary session, fraction meeting, budgetary meeting, special committee meeting (Pansus), in the implementation of legislative, budgetary, and supervisory functions.

In the plenary assembly, at the first stage of explanation from the proposer of regional regulation also at the second stage which is the general review of each fraction, to the fourth stage in which the final decision by the whole fractions a decision was made based on the fractions' intension. In other words, it can be said that the parliament's attitude is the attitude of the fractions. Although there are differences among the individuals in the fraction, the final decision is always in the fractions. You like it or not, every fraction member has to obey the fraction decision though sometimes the fraction's decision opposes the individual's intention. This signifies that in the plenary assembly the fraction performance is more dominant and because of that a fraction sometimes dissolves because parts of its members disagree with the decision. It is understandable because a fraction may consist of members from various political parties; therefore the parties' interest is more dominant than the public's interest.

Fractions are not an organ of Regional Representatives (DPRD) and actually are groupings of political parties based on the seats gained in the parliament. Although fractions are not organs of the Regional Parliament, they have a very strategic role because the final decision is on their hands. It is them who decide where the direction leads to. The dominance of the fractions over the regional parliament members cause the members could not do anything because they will always be limited with the rules in the fraction. Sometimes there are some bright ideas from the members but when it is politically disadvantageous to the fraction, it will not be accepted by the fractions. This supports the statement saying that the parliament's performance will depend mostly on the performance of the fraction. The members' performance should not defy the fraction's intention. When it happens, the faction has a right to terminate the membership of such a member. Because the rules in the faction are so tight, nothing could be done. Most of them think it is better safe than sorry. Such a condition is in line with what *Mc. Clelland* said as "a need for affiliation" which means that someone will act and behave to develop a pleasant mutual understanding. An interview conducted to a member of a fraction from Golkar party:

"Were the rules regulating the fraction a bit softer that is the decision is not in the fraction's hand, I am very sure the members' creativity will appear".

In such a condition, the parliament members would behave in orientation to meet the group's interest not the public's interest. This condition has been a phenomenon, part of the culture not only in the region but also all over the country. That is why we see rallies against the regional parliament due to of the parliament member either individually or in groups instead of fighting for the community's needs, they fight for the needs of their own parties. If the ideal condition is desired by the parliament in which the parliament struggles for the community's prosperity, the rules regulating the fraction's behaviour need to be reviewed. This is very closely related to the general election system in which we have not yet adopted the district system but still equal to proportionate system authorising the political party to nominate the candidate acquiring votes for the seat in the parliament.

From the data of fraction meetings conducted during the assembly period of 2010, a total of 56 times of meetings resulting in 8 decrees of the regional representative, and 11 decrees of the head of the regional parliament. If compared the number of meetings with the decree made, it can be concluded that in every meeting only 0.33 decree is made. So the meeting frequency is high but the decree issued is low. Fractional meetings conducted in the first assembly in 2010 were 50 times which resulted in 3 Regional Representative's decrees, 2 regional rules, and 19 decrees of the head of the regional people's representatives (parliament). The facts implied that every meeting only produced 0.48 decision. In other words, every decision made in repeated meetings is not optimal. This situation is very common in this kind of meeting because of the interest between individual and groups (parties). All commission meetings performed in the fourth assembly period of 2009 were 76 times and had produced 8 parliament decrees and 11 decrees of the head of regional parliament. From the number of meeting and the number of decrees produced, it can be concluded that every meeting only produced 0.25 decree.

It is a quite different case with the commission meeting conducted in the assembly period of 2010. All meetings performed were 219 times resulting 3 regional parliamentary decrees, 19 decrees of the head of regional parliament, and 2 regional rules. The data shows that every meeting only produced only 0.10 decree. The frequency of meeting was very high but the meeting only produced very low result (decree). This simply means that the productivity of the commission should be improved. This condition occurs due to the view of some parliament members that the meetings were routine and it was not necessary to seriously discuss the meeting material. In fact, some of them only came and signed the attendance list and left again for personal business to attend to. The cause of the repeated meetings was no agreement reached due to each one's vested interest. Sometimes, the discussion broadened and slipped out of the focus. However, the meeting can be short when every one's interest was fulfilled. An example when a meeting was running with a work unit, the commission asked for something, mark-up budget occurred at both disposals and then the discussion ran very smoothly and quickly. When it happened like this the budget committee had to find fund to meet the demand of the commission. Such funding has to be prepared by a work unit in the form of official travel letter for the parliament members and the accountability was made by the work unit. Such performance by the parliament members was described by Simon (1986) as an attitude driven by economic motive. However, to some people the economic benefit was not the ultimate goal; it was only a means to attain final targets.

The budgetary committee meeting is full of deals and agreements between the budgetary committee and the city government's budgetary team. When a deal is made, the budgetary discussion would run smoothly. The budget for the parliament members comes from two different sources: fixed expenditure and the head and members' allowance which is 8.38

billion rupiah and fixed expenditure was budgeted 12.12 billion by the parliament secretariat. The total budget used by the regional parliament is 20.50 billion rupiah and it comes from locally generated revenue (PAD) of Makassar City which is more than 170.8 billion.

The fixed income and allowance of the head of regional parliament is Rp. 15,923,324 per month and the vice is Rp. 15,600,500. Each member will receive 12,849, 590, per month. From the many allowances received, housing allowance is the largest. For the vice, it is Rp. 9,000,000 per month while each member receives Rp. 8,000,000 per month. The allowance is meant to support them in renting a house particularly for those who do not stay in the city. In fact, all the members are from Makassar and dwell in the city. Actually, there is no reason for the parliament members to have the housing allowance as much as that. On the contrary, the fact proves that they only think more about themselves and their group than about the people's needs. They have reasonably high salary but always complain of being insufficient for their needs.

Other funding sources used by the parliament allocated through the secretariat of the regional parliament with a total of 12.122 billion are intended for the support of the parliament activities in a year. Detail breakdown of the use of the fund reveals that the official uniforms for the members were proposed every year with a total budget of Rp. 315,000,000. From the data obtained it is revealed that they never buy any uniform with a reason that the last year uniform is still usable. But the allocated budget is taken and used for various other uses not specified in the provision.

The budget for official travel is interesting to study because it is quite a large number i.e. 4.3 billion rupiah. From the information obtained in the field, some important findings are revealed: the official travel expenses proposed were used to conduct comparative study particularly outside the region. In order to cash the budget, every discussion on the draft of the regional regulations was always connected to the comparative study to gain more references. This is actually only an insubstantial reason because the real reason is to cash the budget for this purpose which had already stated in the regional budgetary plan. Such attitude performed by the parliament members this way according to Simon (1986) has an economic motive that is to make a certain consensus to fulfil the economic needs of the parliament members through the regional budgetary plan.

To get a description of the parliamentary members' attitude in the decision making during the special committee meeting of regional regulation draft of the provision of educational program implementation and special committee for 28 other bills. When the committee discussed the bill for educational implementation, the special committee concluded that this bill needed more comparative reference therefore a comparative study was needed. The committee finally decided to have a comparative study at Cimahi. This decision is irrational because the fund spent for this activity is costly considering the significance of the information needed and the output of this activity. From the information gained from one of the members of the special committee, it was mentioned that every comparative study took about 7 to 8 million rupiahs per person depending on the distance of the destination areas. The special committee members might consist of 27 persons. When the comparative study was to be performed all these people had to go along.

My interview with the special committee member revealed that after the 2 hour discussion with the government of Cimahi when they returned to Makassar, they were not able to

discuss it because. It needs adjustment to the law of teacher and lecturer. Because of this, until this study was conducted, the discussion of the bill was not finished.

Another example is when the special committee discussed 28 bills of regional regulation simultaneously; the special committee was made into 8 groups to discuss 8 bills. All went for comparative studies in different areas in Indonesia particularly in Jawa. From the observation made when attending the meetings between the special committee and the executive, the discussion was only about technical matters and at the end the special committee decided to conduct a comparative study outside Sulawesi. When this decision was made, it was obvious that the committee made it for the sake of the individuals or group. It does not make sense to do a comparative study for more references. When references are needed, it is not necessary to leave the city. The information can be obtained through the web. The comparative study was made to consume the budget allocated for it. That is why when the special committee went for comparative study; it invited a lot of criticism directed to the parliament members because the cost of the program did not worth the result. When they returned from comparative study, the meeting conducted were no longer interesting because after the improvement made by the executive; they would continue the discussion at stage IV, which is the presentation of the final statement of the fractions of the parliament.

Such condition referring to theory of behaviour of Simon (1986) stating that human behaviour is usually oriented to economic motive. This is relevant with the parliament members' behaviour when they decided to conduct comparative study in different regions. The economic benefit obtained is not the final goal but only means for further goals.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The political attitude of the parliament members in the formulation of rules and regulations and policies was mainly dominated by the political party where they belong to. The members confirmed that the political agenda of the fraction and party was closely related to political and economic interest of the party or members. The broader community's need was not addressed in the product of the parliament. In the implementation of legislative function, the parliament members rely on the regional budgetary plan proposed by the regional government. The members also admitted that they could not provide a study on the proposal to counter the argument mentioned by the executive. Most of them would perform the standard procedure to proceed with the bill until it became an act of parliament. The limitation of the parliament members confines them to give satisfactory response and recommendation on any policies.
2. The attitude of the regional parliament members in the implementation of their budgetary function to discuss the regional budgetary plan proposed by the city government was not based on the fundamental elements of budgetary composition. In the field, the political attitude of the parliament members in making a decision is often criticised by the public. They are often accused of struggling only to take care of their own needs. When the regional budgetary plan was discussed among the budgetary committee, the city government, and the commission members with the related institutions discussing about the bill of education, health, alcoholic drinks, and the used cloth sales, they were criticised because of cooperating with the city government to meet their specific demand that is to as a return for the favour they gave to smoothen the discussion process.
3. The political attitude in the decision making in the regional parliament in the supervisory function generates problems because no clear boundary set the functional

duties which frequently criticised by the city government as a correction and for effective and precise performance of this function. Such implementation in the meeting/assembly for the discussion of the bill by the regional parliamentary is considered insufficient because the parliament members considered that the implementation by the city government is sufficient. The regional parliament of Makassar can supervise the implementation of the program when the implementation process is considered opposing the current laws and the national and regional policies. The implementation of such program may have serious policy and political impacts. Supervision in this stage program is quite problematic and susceptible to politicisation.

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